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The 1980s were a period of substantial changes in the U.S. tax code and
income distribution. Even after controlling for demand-side factors that
altered the returns to education, researchers have shown that behavioral
responses to tax reform remain substantial. This paper reviews the les-
sons that have emerged from research on the behavioral response to tax
reforms, focusing primarily on the labor supply response. The paper
also builds on that work by examining whether the dramatic responses
in taxable income over the 1980s are due to an increase in male labor
market participation. Microdata from 1976 to 1993 are consistent with
only a small male labor supply response after the Tax Reform Act of
1986. This finding is important for the interpretation of previous work
and for the design of tax policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s were a period of substantial changes in the U.S. tax code.
Between 1980 and 1989, two tax laws collapsed the federal personal
income tax schedule from 14 to 2 (nominal) brackets,1 reduced the top
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1The phaseout of the personal exemption and the 15 percent bracket created additional 33
percent brackets for upper income taxpayers.120Eissa
marginal rate from 70 to 28 percent, and removed an estimated 6 million
poor households from the tax rolls. For the typical familywith twice the
median income, the marginal rate on income was 15 percentage points
lower in 1988 than in 1980. For the family with the median income, the
federal marginal rate was 9 percentage points lower (see Bosworth and
Burtless, 1992).
The 1980s were also a period of substantial changes in the income
distribution. Between 1980 and 1990, the share of income accruing to the
top 5 percent of the family income distribution rose from 15.3 to17.4
percent. The share of income accruing to the top quintile of that income
distribution rose from 41.5 to 44.3 percent. Many explanations for the
rising share of income at the top of the distribution have been put for-
ward, mostly related to changes in the returns to education that derive
from the demand side of the market. Even after controlling for other
factors, several researchers (Lindsey, 1987; Feldstein, 1995; Navratil,
1994; Auten and Carroll, 1995) have shown that behavioral responses to
tax reform are part of the explanation for the rising share of income at
the top of the distribution.2
This paper reviews the evidence on the behavioral response to the tax
reforms, focusing primarily on the labor supply response. Several stud-
ies provide direct evidence on the labor supply response (Bosworth and
Burtless, 1992; Eissa, 1995a,b; Eissa and Liebman, 1995). The studies that
look at the taxable response, on the other hand, provide suggestive
evidence of labor supply responses. Although that evidence shows that
growth in wage and salary income is an important component of the
taxable income response (Navratil, 1994; Slemrod, 1995), it does not
separate the labor supply response from other factors, such as reporting
and compensation decisions.
Although the female labor supply did respond to the incentives in the
tax reforms, it is unlikely that the increase in income is due to their
increasing labor market participation. Overall, the share of women in the
work force increased by 3 percentage points between 1980 and 1990,
from 42.4 to 45.4 percent, but unless married, these women are not at
the upper end of the income distribution, where we observe most of the
income responses. Moreover, women married to high-income men do
not earn enough to explain the surge in income. Mean earnings of mar-
ried women in the highest decile of the taxable income distribution were
$5,100 in 1985 ($11,638 conditional on working) (Navratil, 1994).
Essentially all research shows that male participation and hours of
2The findings are derived from the distribution of taxable income, which can differ from
the family income distribution.Tax Reforms and Labor Supply121
work do not respond to changes in after-tax wages (Hausman, 1985;
Pencavel, 1986; Triest, 1992). However, two reasons suggest that study-
ing the male labor supply is important: first, the strong incomere-
sponse to the tax reforms in the 1980s raises the question of whether
male labor market participation is an important component. Second,
the participation decision of men may have become more responsive to
taxes because their participation rate is much lower than it was two
decades ago (Heckman, 1993). During 1967-1969, the participation rate
of men was 92.7 percent, but by 1985-1987, it had fallen to 86.8 percent
(Juhn, 1992).
This paper examines the labor supply response of prime-agemen
(between the ages of 16 and 48) to the tax reforms of the 1980s. Using
microdata from 1976 to 1993 and estimating simple reduced-form labor
supply regressions, I find results that are consistent with a small labor
supply response to the tax reforms. For men with more than 16years of
schooling, the estimated increase in total hours of work is about 50 hours
per year, or 2 percent. The estimates suggest that the income response
observed in the tax return data is due more to other factors, suchas
shifting of income, other dimensions of labor supply (productivity,occu-
pational choice), and compensation decisions.
The current paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes impor-
tant features of the U.S. tax reforms from 1980 to 1993 and covers
changes in the taxation of earned income resulting from the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), and
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93). Section 3
then reviews the evidence on the behavioral responses to taxes. An
analysis of the male labor supply follows in Section 4, whichcovers the
data and the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. TAX REFORMS, 1980-1993
In this section, I summarize features of the tax laws that are relevant for
the treatment of earned income. In addition to the three tax laws passed
(ERTA, TRA, and OBRA93), changes in the social security system that
affected marginal (and average) rates for many taxpayers are discussed.
The first major tax law of the period, the ERTA, was passed in 1981.
The ERTA called for an across-the-board reduction in marginal tax rates
of 23 percent, to be phased in between 1982 and 1984. The top tax rate
A secondary earner tax deduction, equal to 10 percent of the earnings of the lower earning
spouse up to $30,000 was introduced. This provision is unlikely to affect the labor supply

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Tax Reforms and Labor Supply123
bracket was lowered from 70 to 50 percent, effective in 1982. The ERTA
included few provisions to alter the tax base, and so lower marginal rates
should have translated into lower average rates for these taxpayers.
Although the ERTA reduced statutory marginal rates within each
bracket, this did not translate into lower effective marginal (and average)
rates for many taxpayers. For high-income taxpayers, the effective reduc-
tion in marginal rates was less than the implied 20 percentage points
because the Maximum Tax, passed as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
kept marginal rates on earned income well below the 70 percent rate (see
Lindsey, 1981). For many low- and middle-income taxpayers, marginal
(and average) rates did not fall because of the increase in social security
taxes. The payroll tax (on the employer and the employee) was increased
by 2.76 percentage points, and the maximum taxable incomewas in-
creased from $25,900 in 1980 to $39,600 in 1985 (Table 1).This offset a
full percentage point of the marginal rate reduction for the taxpayer
earning $35,000 after the ERTA.5 Taxpayers with less than $50,000 faced
the same or higher effective rates after the ERTA as before (Lindsey,
1987).
The TRA represented a shift in the tax code to low marginal rates
imposed on a broad tax base. It was designed to be bothrevenue neutral
and distributionally neutral. The tax law had important effectson low-
and high-income taxpayers and little or no effect on a large section of the
population. Hausman and Poterba (1987) estimate that more than 40
percent of the population would see a change in marginal rates of less
than 10 percent, whereas only 11 percent would face marginal tax reduc-
tions of at least 10 percentage points.6 The tax law collapsed the previous
11 income tax brackets into 2 (nominal) brackets: 15 and 28 percent. The
However, the deduction should generate some substitution in the labor supply of husband
and wife if they make a joint decision.
The appropriate social security tax is the difference between the present discounted value
of benefits and the present discounted value of taxes. Although the difference is small for
men (Feldstein and Samwick, 1992), the properly measured tax rate nonetheless increased
during the decade.
For some, the increase in the maximum taxable income raised marginal rates by the full
14 percentage points.
6To reconcile these figures with the data of Bosworth and Burtless cited previously, it is
important to recognize that the effects of the TRA on marginal rates for taxpayersnear the
median of the income distribution are quite heterogenous. The 15 percent bracket in 1989
included taxpayers who had faced marginal rates between 11 and 24 percent in 1980. The
typical family with the median income in the study by Bosworth and Burtless faceda 24
percent rate in 1980 and a 15 percent rate in 1989. Taxpayers with slightly more income
faced the 28 percent rate in 1980 and 1989. Hausman and Poterba (1987) present aggregate
figures based on the distribution of taxpayers along the tax schedule.124Eissa
phaseout of the 15 percent bracket and the personal exemptioncreated a
33 percent tax bracket for higher income individuals.
For high-income individuals, the TRA reduced the top income mar-
ginal rate from 50 to 28 percent by 1988. Statutory marginal ratesfell by
at least 10 percentage points for those withtaxable income over $65,000.
The income effect of these marginal rate reductions wasoffset for higher
income individuals by the expansion of the tax base.After the TRA,
taxpayers could no longer exclude 60 percentof capital gains from ad-
justed gross income (ACT), deduct certain interest payments, or use
passive losses to offset other income.7
For poor Americans, the law affected both averageand marginal tax
rates. It removed an estimated 6 million taxpayersfrom the tax rolls by
increasing the dependent exemption (from $1,086 in 1986 to$1,950 in
1988) and the standard deduction (from $2,480 in 1986 to$4,400 in 1988
for a taxpayer filing as head of household). Inaddition, the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) was expanded. The EITCis a refundable
credit, so taxpayers who owed no taxes could havereceived a refund of
up to $874 in1988.8 The expansions in the EITC and other provisions in
the TRA of 1986 reduced the tax liability for the averagefemale head of
household by $1,100 (Eissa and Liebman, 1995).
Although the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990increased
the top rate to 31 percent, by the early 1990smarginal rates on the
highest income Americans were substantially lower than adecade ear-
lier (see Table 1). Partially to redress the perceived inequitiesin the tax
system due to the tax reforms of the 1980s,the OBRA93 included several
provisions to increase the progressivity of the taxcode. The OBRA93
increased marginal rates for high-income individuals. Itcreated a new
tax bracket, 36 percent for taxpayers earning over$140,000. Also, a sur-
tax on individuals earning more than $250,000effectively created a 39.6
percent bracket.9
The TRA also increased the corporate income tax, generatingadditional income and
substitution effects for some high-income individuals.
8The EITC creates a complicated and ambiguous set of labor supplyincentives. Standard
labor supply theory predicts that the EITC will encourage laborforce participation because
it is available only to taxpayers with earned income. Buttheory also predicts that the credit
reduces the number of hours worked by most eligible taxpayersalready in the labor force.
Although the credit initially increases with income, producing offsettingincome and substi-
tution effects on hours worked, more than 70 percent of recipientshave incomes in regions
in which the credit is constant (and therefore produces only anegative income effect on
labor supply) or is being phased out (producing negative incomeand substitution effects).
Additional provisions in the OBRA93 raised the highest marginal rate evenfurther.
Taxpayers earning more than $108,450 were required to reduce theiritemized deductions
by 3 percent and thus faced a marginal rate of 41 percent.Also, the law adds another 2.9Tax Reforms and Labor Supply125
TheOBRA93also expanded the EITC for low-income individuals. The
expansions of the EITC are such that by1996,it will surpass Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as the largest federalpro-
gram to alleviate poverty. The credit is scheduled to be phased in at a40
percent rate up to a maximum of$3,370for a family with two or more
children and at a34percent rate for a family with one child up to a
maximum of$2,040.
These tax reforms clearly generated both income and substitution ef-
fects. To consider their effects, we refer to the basic model generally
used to analyze labor supply and taxes. The model hypothesizes that the
individual maximizes utility to determine consumption (ofa composite
good) and hours of work. A tax increase makes the individualpoorer
and reduces his consumption of leisure (increases work). This is the
income effect. A tax also reduces the after-tax wage and makes the individ-
ual work less. This is the substitution effect. Since these effects work in
opposite directions, the net effect of tax reform on labor supply isusu-
ally ambiguous. Under some circumstances, the direction of the labor
supply effect of a tax reform can be certain. A tax reform that reduces
marginal rates but leaves average rates constant has an unambiguous
positive effect on hours of work.
3. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED: BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSES TO TAX REFORMS
The tax reforms of the1980sgave economists an unprecedented opportu-
nity to study individual behavioral responses to To study the
percent (on the employer and the employee) to the marginal rate for workers with wages
and salary over $135,000 by eliminating the cap on the hospital insurance portion of social
security.
10To place the following discussion in context, it is useful to consider the labor supply
literature in the early 1980s and its implications for the effects of the tax reformson labor
supply. Since the labor supply literature is large and has been reviewed extensively else-
where (see Hausman, 1985; Pencavel, 1986; Heckman and Killingsworth, 1986), the focus
here is on research based on Hausman (1981). For a critique of the Hausman study,see
MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990). Hausman estimated preference parameters by solv-
tug an optimizing model in which the nonlinear and nonconvex budget constraints facing
the taxpayers are carefully modeled. Using maximum likelihood methods andcross-
sectional data from the 1975 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Hausman estimated
total hour elasticities for married women and female heads of households similar to those
in the literature at the time. For men, however, his estimates differed markedly. Although
Hausman estimated an uncompensated elasticity of near zero for men, he founda large
income effect and by definition a large substitution effect of taxes. The important implica-
tion of these estimates is that although the tax system does not affect hours worked, it
affects economic welfare.126Eissa
behavioral response to the tax reforms, researchers have usedrepeated
cross sectional data (Lindsey, 1987;Feenberg and Poterba, 1993; Eissa,
1995a), aggregate time series data (Bosworth and Burtless, 1992;Slemrod
1995), and panel data (Feldstein, 1995; Navratil, 1994; Autenand Carroll,
1995). The story that emerges from this work is thatbehavioral re-
sponses to taxes are significant, especiallyfor high-income individuals.
In this section, I review the evidence on the response inlabor supply and
more generally in taxable income. Areview of the taxable income re-
sponse is important because it remainsunexplained and raises the ques-
tion of whether male labor supply is part of the response.
3.1 Total Labor Supply
Bosworth and Burtless (1992) were the first to study thelabor supply
response to the tax reforms of the 1980sdirectly. They used aggregate
data from 1967 to 1989, which they generated from the CurrentPopula-
tion Survey (CPS) to estimate time-series hours ofwork regressions.
Their specification allowed two linear trends, one from 1967 to1989 and
another starting in 1981, and an adjustment for businesscycle effects.
Their regression estimates suggested that men worked 6 percent more
hours and women 5.4 percent more hours in 1989 than in 1981.
To exploit the heterogeneous effect of the tax reforms onindividuals,
Bosworth and Burtless (1992) analyzed responses forindividuals at differ-
ent quintiles of the income distribution. Theyfound that individuals in
the bottom quintile increased their labor supply the most.They esti-
mated a 31 and 16.7 percent increase in total hours worked by menand
women, respectively, in the bottomquintile, but only a 3.2 and 11.8
percent increase by men and women in the topquintile. As they note,
this pattern is not consistent with a pure labor supply story.Marginal
and average rates remained largely unchanged for the bottomquintile,
whereas they fell for the top quintile. Because the patternof responses
does not show that highest income individuals respond most,they con-
cluded that their results only weakly support the predictionof a labor
supply response.
However, the anomaly of large responses by men and womenin the
Hausman (1981) used his estimates to simulate the labor supply effects of 10and 30
percent reductions in marginal rates. He estimated that a 10 percentreduction in marginal
rates would increase labor supply by 1.1 percent for menand 4.1 percent for women,
whereas a 30 percent reduction would increase labor supply by 2.7 percentfor men and 9.4
percent for women. The expectation in the early 1980s wasthat labor supply would in-
crease substantially after the ERTA, which bracketedthe Hausman simulations. Later in
the decade, Hausman and Poterba (1987) also used the Hausman estimates topredict the
effects of the TRA of 1986. They concluded that the TRA of 1986would have only modest
effects on aggregate labor supply because it had only modest effects onmarginal rates.Tax Reforms and Labor Supply127
bottom quintile may be partially explained by the business cycle. In 1981,
the national unemployment rate was 7.6 percent. By 1989, it had fallento
5.3 percent, the lowest rate since 1973. The bottom quintile of the family
income distribution in 1981 will include a disproportionate number of
individuals who are unemployed because of the recession. Although
Bosworth and Burtless (1992) adjust for business cycle effects in their
regressions, their procedure almost builds in a response after 1981. This
built-in increase in labor supply by men in the bottom quintile results
from depressing their total hours worked in 1981 by allocatingto that
group men who are strongly affected by the recession.
Another anomaly from the perspective of a tax response is that hours
worked by older groups (between ages 45 and 64) increased ata faster
rate after 1981 than hours worked by younger groups. However, labor
market participation by older men may be responding to different fac-
tors, such as social security and private pensions. The large increase in
the growth of social security benefits throughout the late 1960s and 1970s
and the subsequent decline in the 1980s may explain part of the trend in
the labor market participation of older men.
3.2 Female Labor Supply
In this section I review studies that focused on the female labor supply
response to the tax reforms (Eissa, 1995a,b; Eissa and Liebman, 1995).
Eissa (1995a,b) analyzed the effect of the TRA and ERTAon the labor
supply of married women, and Eissa and Liebman (1995) analyzed the
effect of the EITC and other provisions in the TRA on the labor supply of
female heads of households.
These studies differ from Bosworth and Burtless (1992) in the data and
methodology used. Although all the studies used the March CPS, Bos-
worth and Burtless (1992) used data from 1967 to 1989, whereas Eissa
(1995a,b) and Eissa and Liebman (1995) used data immediately surround-
ing the actual tax acts. In addition, Bosworth and Burtless (1992)aggre-
gated the data by demographic group, and so hada single annual obser-
vation for each group. Eissa (1995a,b) and Eissa and Liebman (1995), in
contrast, used individual data. This strategy reflected the source of varia-
tion used to estimate the effect of the tax laws. By aggregating the data,
Bosworth and Burtless (1992) relied on time to identify the effects of the
tax laws. In their study, the change in the time trend starting in 1981
signaled the response to the tax reforms. The Eissa (1995a,b) and Eissa
and Liebman (1995) studies, discussed in more detail in this section,
relied on variation in marginal rates over time and betweengroups to
identify the effect of the law.
The idea of these reports is that tax reforms offer time variation in128Eissa
marginal and average rates that is arguably more exogenousthan is
available in the cross section. Generally,cross-sectional labor supply
equations are hard to estimate for reasons thatrelate to endogenous and
missing wages, taxes, and nonlinear budget sets.The first problem is
that taxes and labor supply are endogenouslydetermined. A second
problem is that cross-sectional differences in after-tax wagesresult from
differences in education, family structure and size,and other factors that
also affect labor supply decisions. A third problemencountered in the
empirical analysis of taxation and labor supply is thatnonlinear budget
sets, owing to a progressive taxschedule, complicate the estimation
procedure considerably.
To avoid these complications, these studiesfocused on groups that
were strongly affected by the taxlaws. To estimate the effect of the law,
they compared the change in labor supply of womenwhose incentives
were greatly affected withthose whose incentives were little affected.
For example, the TRA reduced marginal ratesfor women whose hus-
bands were at the top of the income distributionbut less so for those
whose husbands were lower in the incomedistribution. The EITC, on
the other hand, affected single women withqualifying children and did
not affect single women withoutchildren.11 The difference in the change
in hours worked by these two groups is an estimateof the effect of the
law.
The assumption that identifies the effect of thepolicy is that allocation
to the treatment (affected) group is exogenous.If there were no as-
sortative mating (people did not marry thosewho are like them), or if
having a child were an exogenous event, thisassumption would gener-
ate treatment and control groups thathave the same distribution of
preferences and characteristics. However, it isunlikely that any policy
change would differentially affect otherwiseidentical groups. Women
who marry upper income men are observationallydifferent from women
who marry lower income men. To overcomethis problem, we control for
relevant characteristics. Once observablecharacteristics are controlled
for, the assumption is weakened substantially. Toidentify the response,
we require that thedistribution of unobservables remains constant over
time.
To control for differences in the observablecharacteristics of the respec-
tive groups, Eissa (1995a,b) and Eissa and Liebman(1995) estimate equa-
tions of the following form:
11A qualifying child is a child, grandchild, stepchild, or fosterchild of the taxpayer; is
under the age of 19 (under 24 if a full-time student) or permanentlydisabled; and has lived
with the taxpayer for more than one half of the tax year.Tax Reforms and Labor Supply129
1it =f(a0+a1Q + $+$ilt + $I), (1)
whereis a dummy variable for the treatment group (and iszero for the
control group); I is a dummy variable for time (t= 1 after the tax acts); I
is the product of the time and group dummy variables; Q includes ob-
servable characteristics of the individual; 1jt is themeasure of labor supply
(participation and hours worked); and f is the normal density in the
participation equation.
This "difference-in-difference" approach requires that thereare no con-
temporaneous changes in policy or other factors that differentially affect
the two groups. Where possible, one can account for suchoccurrences by
changing the specification of Q. For example, high-incomewomen have
more education than low-income women at a time when returns to educa-
tion were increasing. Such differences can bias the results because they
conflate the effects of increased demand with responses to tax reductions.
If Q includes a variable that interacts education with time, the bias is
reduced.
Using imputed marginal tax rates, the elasticity of labor supply is
calculated as follows:
I2
- LI(1- T)T - LI(1 - T)C'
where f2 is the difference in labor supply changes (see equation [1]);T is
the marginal rate; LI is the percent change; T is the treatmentgroup; and
C is the control group.
3.2.1 Married Women Using data from the 1984-1986 and 1990-1992
March CPS, Eissa (1995a) identified the impact of tax reform bycompar-
ing the change in labor supplied by higher incomewomen to the change
in labor supplied by women with less income. Higher incomewomen
were those whose other household income (husband's earned income
and family unearned income) placed them at or above the 99th percentile
of the CPS income distribution; women with less incomewere between
the 75th and 80th and the 90th and 95th percentiles of thesame income
distribution.
Table 2 presents the figures for the increase in labor force participation
and in total labor supply under different assumptions. These figuresare
based on predictions from participation and hours-worked regressions,
specified as equation (1). The top panel shows the relative increase in the
labor force participation rate of high-income marriedwomen; the bottom
(2)130Eissa
TABLE 2
Effects of TIM of 1986 on Labor Supply of High-IncomeMarried Women
and Their Elasticity Estimates
Data are March Current Population Survey 1984-1986 and 1990-1992; see Eissa (1995a)for details.
panel presents the corresponding figures for the increase intotal hours
of work per year. Although several estimates of the impactof the TRA
are plausible, all point to thegeneral conclusion that the labor supply of
married women increased after the reduction in marginal tax rates.The
relative participation increase of 19.5 percent (9 percentagepoints) and
the relative hours increase of 34.5 percent (206 hours peryear) are con-
taminated by several factors, including a trend componentand other
contemporaneous demand shocks. Using differentcontrol groups re-
duces these estimates dramatically. Controlling forobservable character-
istics reduces the estimated participation responsefurther to 8.4 percent
using the first control group and 10.9 percent using thesecond control
group. The corresponding response intotal labor supply is in the range
of 16.9 to 18.4 percent. These estimates are purged of thetrend compo-
nent and any other factors that are common for womenwhose husbands
have less income but not of factors that differ betweenhigher and lower
income women, such as changes in the returns to education.
Because women in the 99th percentile of the incomedistribution are
more educated on average thanother women, part of their response
may be due to higher gross wagesrather than to lower taxes. Allowing
different responses by more educated women reduces by onehalf the
labor supply effect for the 75th percentile group: allof this effect is
operating through the participation decision. There is noanalogous ef-
fect for the 90th percentile group; this result is not surprisingsince the
difference in average education levels between thiscontrol group and
the treatment group is only half a year.











No control group 34.5
75th percentile 12.3 8.4 4.3 0.2-0.4
90th percentile 13.0 10.9 11.4 0.6
Total labor supply
No control group 19.5
75th percentile 22.8 18.4 12.3 0.6-1.0
90th percentile 19.8 16.9 14.6 0.9-1.0Tax Reforms and Labor Supply131
between 0.6 and 1 (including both participation and hours ofwork).
Approximately half this response is due to participation. Although the
total elasticity estimate is not very different from previous estimatesin
the literature, its composition is different. Mroz (1987) and Triest (1990)
found that hours of work for workingwomen are not affected by the
after-tax wage and suggest that the participation decision isresponsive
to the wage.
In a similar analysis of the ERTA, Eissa (1995b) founda similar overall
elasticity but that most of the response to tax reductions results from
additional participation. Several differences between the ERTA and TRA
can help explain these findings, but the basic explanation is that the 1981
"experiment" is not as clean as the 1986 one. Changes in the income
distribution and growth in wage inequality were particularly dramatic in
the early 1980s. Moreover, the marginal tax reductionswere much larger
in 1986 than in 1981. The different results point out a potential problem
with the "difference-in-difference" approach, which is that it estimates
only the net effect of the policy. I return to this issue in Section 5.
3.2.2 Female Heads of HouseholdsEissa and Liebman (1995) focused
on the effects of the TRA and EITC on single women with children.
Female heads of households are an important group because theyare
the largest group of taxpayers eligible for the EITC, makingup approxi-
mately 48 percent of the EITC-eligible population (Eissa and Liebman,
1993). They identified the impact of the EITC by comparing the change
in labor supplied by women with children to the change in laborsup-
plied by women with no children.
Table 3 presents the estimated labor supply response of female heads
of households. Eissa and Liebman (1995) found that after the TRA, the
labor force participation of single women with children increased by1.9
to 2.8 percentage points relative to single women without children (from
a base of 73.0 percent). They argue that this 2.6 to 3.8 percent increase in
participation can be thought of as a response to a $1,100 increase in after-
tax income.
Three pieces of evidence suggest that the estimated effectwas due to
the EITC and not to other parts of the TRAor other government policies.
First, in the period that they studied, the amount of EITCa taxpayer
received depended only on having a child, and they found that the
increase in participation is mostly a response to the return to the first
child in the tax unit. The effect of the EITC falls from 3.8 to 3.3percent
once they allow a different response for families with at least two chil-
dren. Second, the timing of the post-1987 participation increase is consis-





















































































































































































































































































































































































0Tax Reforms and Labor Supply133
recipients would have first become aware of the increase around April of
1988 when they received their 1987 tax refund. If it takes some time to
adjust to new incentives, only a limited response should occur in 1988,
with a full response in 1989. Eissa and Liebman (1995) found that by
1988, single women with children had increased their relative labor sup-
ply by only 1.1 percent, but that in 1989 and 1990, the impact reached 4
percent. Third, Eissa and Liebman (1995) found that the EITC had its
largest effect among people most likely to be eligible for the credit. The
predicted participation response was approximately 13 percent for
women with less than 12 years of schooling and only 0.4 percent for
women with more than 12 years of schooling.
Eissa and Liebman (1995) also found no evidence that the EITC expan-
sion had any effect on the hours of work of single women with children
who were already in the labor force; the estimates for the total-hours
response are similar to the participation responses (Table 3).
3.3 Taxable Income
Other than Bosworth and Burtless (1992), no studies have directly ana-
lyzed the male labor supply response to the tax reforms. In this section, I
review the evidence on the taxable income response and argue that the
large observed responses beg for a direct examination of the male labor
supply over the 1980s.
In a series of papers, Lindsey (1987, 1988) examined the income re-
sponse to the ERTA. He used tax return data from 1979 and the NBER
TAXSIM model to impute an income distribution for 1982-1984, and com-
pared that with the actual income distributions for those years. Compari-
son of two income distributions showed that high-income taxpayers had
substantially more income after 1981 in the actual than in the predicted
income distribution, whereas low-income taxpayers had less income.
Imputed marginal tax rates showed that the change in the income
distribution was consistent with the incentives of the ERTA. Only high-
income taxpayers saw a reduction in their marginal rates after the
ERTA. Inflation and expansions in the social security payroll offset
most of the marginal rate reductions for middle- and low-income indi-
viduals. Using elasticities from the literature, Lindsey calculated that at
least 40 percent of the response was from increased hours of work,
which he estimates at 2.5 percent between 1981 and 1985. The rest is
change in the form of compensation (more money wages and fewer
untaxed fringe benefits).
Using panel tax return data, Navratil (1994) estimated a taxable re-
sponse that is substantial but considerably smaller than Lindsey's. He
also found that wage income is an important component of that re-134Eissa
sponse and concludes that "wageand salary growth may be more the
result of supply-side factors than is generally suspected."12
Tax return panel data were also used by Feldstein (1995) and Autenand
Carroll (1995) to study the taxable income response to the TRA.Feldstein
grouped taxpayers by their 1985 marginal tax rate and comparedtheir
reported taxable income in 1985 with that in 1988. He estimated a substan-
tial increase in taxable income for upper income taxpayers. Autenand
Carroll extended the Feldstein study to account for nontax changesin the
economy using data that had a largesample of high-income returns. In
addition their data included the occupation of the taxpayer,which they
used to control for changes in returns to education and otherlabor de-
mand factors. They found that half their taxable income response wasdue
to demand factors but still concluded that behavioral responsesto the
TRA are substantial.
Although the evidence that taxable income responded quite dramati-
cally to the tax reforms is clear, the components of that response areless
clear. If we care about the broader dimensions of laborsupply (occupa-
tional choice, human capital), then the taxable income responseis a
better measure than hours worked. However, since taxable incomein-
cludes AGI (wage and salary income, self-employment income, interest,
dividends), deductions, and exemptions, it is critical for tax policy that
we understand the componentsof the taxable income response (see
Slemrod, 1995).
The evidence that exists shows that both AGI and deductionsexplain
the increase in taxable income at higher incomes (Autenand Carroll,
1995). In addition, the largest source of increase in personalincome for
the richest individuals between 1984 and 1990 was wagesand salaries
(45 percent), followed by S corporation income (16.5 percent)and part-
nerships (Slemrod, 1995).'
The key question here is to what extent can the widening wagedistri-
12The difference between the results of Navratil (1994) and Lindsey (1987,1988) relates to
the data used: repeated cross-sectional versus panel data. There are two components tothe
argument. First, repeated cross-sectional data require that individuals atsuccessive
fractiles of the income distribution are essentially the same in 1979 as they are inlater
years. However, at least 34 percent, and as much as77 percent, of 1980 taxpayers are in
different deciles of the taxable income distribution by 1983. Second, repeatedcross-sectional
data require that individuals be grouped by a variable other than actualmarginal tax rates,
thus averaging away much of the variation in tax changes within a group. Useof panel
data overcomes these problems. These arguments are also relevant for theresearch on
labor supply.
13The TRA reduced the top marginal income tax rate below that of the corporate tax rate
and made S corporations, which were subject to the individual income tax, more attractive
than C corporations, which are subject to the corporate income tax.Tax Reforms and Labor Supply135
bution be explained by changes in labor supply. Although the results in
Eissa (1995a,b) suggest a substantial labor supply response by upper
income women, they do not explain the widening income distribution
for two reasons. First, even though their labor supply response was
substantial, there are too few high-income women. Second, women mar-
ried to men atthe top of the income distribution are only weakly at-
tached to the labor force and earn little income, on average. Mean earn-
ings of married women in the highest decile of the other taxable income
distribution were $5,100 in 1985 ($11,638 conditional on working)
(Navratil, 1994).
Although a voluminous body of work has found that male hours of
work and participation are not responsive to economic variables (see
Pencavel, 1986), the significant changes in income after the reforms beg
the question of whether labor supply (participation and hours worked)
responded to tax reforms. Studying male labor supply is therefore impor-
tant not only for a further understanding of the source of the income
response, but for another reason as well. Labor force participation of
prime-age men (between the ages of 16 and 48) has declined from 92.7
percent in 1967-1969 to 86.8 percent in 1985-4987. This declining male
participation opens the possibility that their participation decision may
have become more sensitive to taxation (Heckman, 1993).
4. NEW EVIDENCE ON BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO
TAX REFORM
In this section, I present evidence on the male labor supply behavior
over the past two decades. The goal of this exercise is to examine
whether the evidence is consistent with a labor supply response to the
tax reforms. The examination of the male labor supply response to the
tax reforms is more complicated than that of the female labor supply
response. Unlike married women, whose tax treatment is based on a
husband's and other household income, and female heads of house-
holds, whose tax treatment is based on the presence of a child, the tax
treatment of men cannot be so easily determined. To exploit the differ-
ence in tax changes for men at different points along the income distribu-
tion, education is used as a measure of permanent income and groups
men by the number of years of schooling completed. I define four
groups: less than 12, 12, 13-16, and more than 16 years of schooling.
With this grouping, we can see whether labor supply patterns differed
for groups whose incentives were changed in different ways by the
ERTA and the TRA. We should expect an increase in labor supplied by136Eissa
men with more than 16 years of education to both the ERTA and TRA,
but an increase in labor supplied by men with less than 12 years of
schooling only after the TRA. If both of these groups have similar labor
supply patterns over both periods, then what we estimate is not a re-
sponse to tax reform.
Two troubling aspects of grouping by education shbuld be noted at
the outset. First, although clearly positively correlated with wages, these
education classes explain at most 9 percent of the individual variation in
wages. There remains significant variation in wages within each group.14
Second, returns to education have changed over the same period, mak-
ing it difficult to isolate the effect of the tax changes. I next discuss the
identification of the tax response with the results.
4.1 Data and Sample
I use microdata from the 1977-1994 March CPS.15 The CPS is a nationally
representative data base of approximately 57,000 households.16 The
March data include retrospective income and labor market activity infor-
mation, so that the data are actually for 1976-1993.
The sample includes heads of tax-filing units17 between 24 and 55
years old, not ill or disabled or in school or retired. It also excludes men
who report negative earned income (wage and salary, farm, and self-
employment income) and who report positive earned income but no
hours of work for the year. The sample size for all years is 559,592.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the sample. It also disag-
gregates the samples by educational attainment. The average man is
white, 37 years old, likely to be married, and has completed 1 year of
college education. He earns $26,390 (in 1993 dollars). With 96.7 percent
probability, he works at least 1 hour during the year, and he works an
average of 2,034 hours, 47 weeks per year. The second to fifth columns
in Table 4 separate the sample by years of schooling completed (less than
12, 12, 13-16, and more than 16). Again, the idea of separating men by
schooling is to isolate groups that are affected differentially by the tax
laws. The average man with less than a high school education completes
14 An alternative strategy might be to predict wage income for each individual and use the
predicted income to group individuals. This strategy is problematic because of the ex-
tended time period considered and the top coding of income in the CPS.
15 Before 1977, the CPS reported weeks worked in brackets and provided hours per week
only for the reference period (rather than for the previous year). To avoid imputing the
variables of interest, I exclude those years.
16 This number varies over time.
17 Members of related and unrelated subfamiies residing with the primary family are


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































only the eighth grade, is 2 years older than the average man, and is less
attached to the labor force. In contrast, the average man who has com-
pleted college continues his education for almost 2 years (the CPS top
codes education at 18 years, so that many of these men might attain
more than 2 years of graduate education) and is slightly moreattached to
the labor force.
4.2 Basic Regression Results
In this section, I present the basic labor supply regression and results. I
use three measures of labor supply. The first measureis annual participa-
tion, defined by whether the individual worked any hours during the
year. The other two measures are intended to better captureattachment
to the labor force: percent of weeks worked, defined as weeks worked di-
vided by 52 (weekly participation) and annual hours worked.
The tax laws define three periods over which one can analyze labor
supply behavior: 1976-1981 (before tax reform), 1982-1986 (the ERTA),
and 1987-1993 (the TRA of 1986). Recall that the ERTA was phased in
between 1981 and 1984, whereas the TRA was phased in between 1986
and 1988. If the labor supply response is sluggish, these differences
suggest that we are less likely to observe the full response to the ERTA
than to the TRA.
To motivate the form of the regressions estimated, consider the factors
that may have affected the male labor supply pattern between 1976 and
1993. First, business cycle effects are quite important during this period,
especially in the early 1980s. Second, average levels of school completion
increased steadily over this period (Murphy and Welch, 1992). The
change in the composition of men in the respective education groups
over time might also help explain the observed pattern oflabor supply.18
Finally, important changes in the population structure occurred during
this time. The peak of the baby boom generation entered the labor mar-
ket between 1973 and 1980. Change over time in the skill or tastes of
successive cohorts conflates the response to taxes.
To address these concerns, I estimate the following equation:
= f(a0 + a1Q + /3 ERTA + yTRA), (3)
where ERTA is a dummy variable equal to 1 for tax years between 1982
and 1986; TRA is a dummy variable equal to 1 for tax years after 1986 (the
excluded period is pretax reform); and f is the normal density function
in the analysis of participation. The set of controls includes unearned
18Appendix Tables 1 and 2 present the average characteristics of the sample, classified by
education.TABLE 5
Coefficients from Labor Supply Regressions: Period Dummy Variables
Panel C: Total Hours Worked (OLS)
Tax Reforms and Labor Supply139
Note: Data are from the March Current Population Survey from 1976 to 1993. Regressions include
education and education squared for the sample of all men only; age and age squared, unearned
income, family size, a dummy variable for marital status (= 1 if married), a dummy variable for race (= 1
if nonwhite), business cycle controls (contemporaneous and lagged gross domestic product growth
rate), and cohort dummy variables. Data are presented as mean value (standard error).
income, age and its square, education and its square, marital status,
children, race (= 1 if nonwhite), and current and lagged gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rates.'9'2°
Panels A-C of Table 5 present the coefficients from regression equation
'I define eight dummy cohorts: men born during the periods 1921-1930, 1930-1940, 1940-
1945, 1945-1950, 1950-1955, 1955-1960, 1960-1965, 1965-1970. The excluded dummy is
1965-1970.
20The regressions do not include the hourly wage for two reasons: it is (1) undefined for
nonworkers, and (2) measured with error that is negatively correlated with total hours for
workers. Because these are reduced-form regressions and the wage is excluded, no mean-





Panel A: Annual Participation (Probit)
All men -0.156 (0.11) -0.014 (0.02)
Education
Less than high school -0.289 (0.24) -0.205 (0.04)
High school -0.135 (0.18) 0.019 (0.03)
College -0.113 (0.20) 0.066 (0.03)
Beyond college -0.086 (0.37) 0.057 (0.06)
Panel B: Weekly Participation (OLS)
All men -0.218 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002)
Education
Less than high school -0.425 (0.003) -0.015 (0.004)
High school -0.255 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003)
College -0.108 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003)
Beyond college -0.005 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004)
All men -67.66 (3.19) 1.13 (4.81)
Education
Less than high school -126.02 (7.91) -62.06 (12.01)
High school -74.89 (5.27) 12.42 (7.92)
College -40.78 (5.38) 19.34 (8.11)
Beyond college -22.50 (9.16) 24.59 (13.83)140Eissa
(3) for the entire sample and for samples separated by educational attain-
ment. Panel A presents probit coefficients, and panels B and C present
ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients. The results show a uniform
decline in all labor supply measures during the ERTA period, with the
most severe decline for men without a high-school degree. The coeffi-
cients for the TRA variable show that labor supply remained at levels
below the pretax reform period for this group (the excluded years in
these regressions are 1976-1981). The TRA coefficients for all other groups
show an increase in labor supply relative to the pretax reform period.
Since the change in labor supply relative to the ERTA period determines
the size of the TRA effect, these coefficients need to be transformed.
Table 6 reinterprets the results of Table 5. The first column reports the
average labor supply for each group in the excluded period,and the
second and third columns present the average change in participation
after the ERTA and TRA (relative to the previous period). All three
panels show marginal effects. Panel A presents the marginal effects
calculated from probits of annual participation, and panels B and C
present the coefficients from OLS regressions of weekly participation
and total annual hours.
After controlling for individual characteristics and business cycle and
cohort effects, the results for all men show a labor supply decline of
1.086 percentage points in annual participation (67.66 total hours) in the
ERTA period and a rise of 1.178 percentage points (68.79 total hours) in
the TRA period for all men.
Different rows in each panel present estimates from regressions that
use different samples. Men with less than 12 years ofeducation show a
consistently larger decline in all measures after the ERTA than all other
groups. All measures of labor supplied by men with less than 12 yearsof
schooling show a rise after the TRA that is smaller than that decline after
ERTA, so that by the late 1980s and early 1990s, labor supplied by less
educated men is still lower than it had been in the late 1970s. Slightly
surprising in Table 6 are the small absolute changes in labor supplied by
men with more than 16 years of schooling. This group, however,had the
strongest attachment to the labor force to begin with so that smaller abso-
lute responses may not be so surprising. The percent reduction in annual
nonparticipation by highly educated men is similar to that of male college
and high-school graduates (26 versus 28.7 and 24 percent, respectively).
Once relevant factors are controlled for, average changes in labor sup-
ply are only weakly correlated with tax changes. Because thisapproach
averages data over many years, however, year effects may biasthe re-
sults. Year effects derive from shifts in the aggregate labor supply func-
tion and from changes over time in wages. To address this issue and toTABLE 6
Labor Market Participation of Men: Period Dummy Regression
Variables
Tax Reforms and Labor Supply141
Average change in labor
supply relative to
previous priod
Note: Data are from the March Current Population Survey, 1976-1993; participation figures are based on
100 percentage points.
exploit the timing of the responses, I next examine more carefully the
trends in labor supply over time.
4.3 Labor Supply Trends
To separate the effects of the tax reforms from those of differential wage
growth and aggregate labor supply trends, assume that growing wage
inequalities affect the trend from 1976 to 1993 and that the ERTA and
TRA affect the trend at 1982 and 1987, respectively. This approach is




Panel A: Annual Participation
All men 96.7 -1.086 1.178
Education
Less than high school 97.1 -2.591 0.857
High school 96.3 -0.995 1.128
College 96.9 -0.666 1.032
Beyond college 97.1 -0.420 0.688
Panel B: Weekly Participation
All men 89.3 -2.037 1.976
Education
Less than high school 86.0 -4.250 2.740
High school 89.2 -2.545 2.549
College 90.7 -1.083 1.357
Beyond College 92.0 -0.484 0.710
Panel C: Total Hours Worked
All men 2,042.6 -67.66 68.79
Education
Less than high school 1,929.7 -126.02 63.96
High school 2,038.0 -74.89 87.30
College 2,079.5 -40.78 60.12
Beyond college 2,168.3 -22.50 47.09142Eissa
similar to that used by Bosworth and Burtless (1992) using aggregate
data from 1968 to 1990. They allowed one trend starting in 1982. With 6
years of data after 1987, a separate trend for TRA can be estimated.
The estimated regression takes the following form:
1it = f(a0 + a1Q1 + /3 Time + y Time82 + 6 Time87, (4)
where Time is a trend starting in 1976; Time82 is a trend starting in 1982;
Time87 is a trend starting in 1987. /3 reflects the patterns in labor supply
due to aggregate trends, such as wage growth; and y and 6 reflect the
effects of the tax reforms.
Table 7 presents the results. Again, all panels present marginal effects,
and different rows present results for different samples, separated by
educational attainment. The estimates for all men show a decline in all
three measures of participation starting in 1977 and increases starting in
1982 and 1987. Labor force participation by prime-age men increased by
0.113 percentage points per year after the ERTA and by 0.2 10 percentage
points per year after the TRA. Total hours worked fell at a rate of 13.43
per year starting in 1977 and rose by almost 6 hours per year after the
ERTA and by an additional 5.7 hours after the TRA.21
The rate of decline throughout the period and the rate of increase after
the ERTA are generally largest for less educated groups (second and
third columns). Annual participation by men with less than 12 years of
schooling fell at a rate of 0.351 percentage points per year starting in 1977
and rose by 0.141 percentage points a year after the ERTA and by 0.260
percentage points after the TRA. Total hours worked increased by 6.35
hours per year after the ERTA and by 15.42 hours per year after the TRA.
The increase after the ERTA is difficult to interpret because marginal and
average rates generally rose for lower income individuals.
A conservative interpretation of these results is that the ERTA trend
partially captures the recovery from the recession of the early 1980s and
other factors unaccounted for in the regressions but not the tax changes.
Even under that interpretation, the evidence suggests a response to the
TRA. The labor supply continues to increase after 1986 and in a pattern
that is consistent with the marginal tax changes in the TRA. The largest
annual responses are by men with less than 12 and more than 16 years of
schooling. Between 1987 and 1990, the annual participation rate of the
least educated rose by 1.04 percentage points, and total hours worked
21The hours-of-work results are most comparable to Bosworth and Burtless (1992). By
1989, men worked a total of 130 hours per year more than in 1981. This estimate translates
into a 6.5 percent increase in total hours worked compared with 6 percent in the Bosworth
and Burtless analysis.TABLE 7
Labor Market Participation of Men: Time Trend Regressions
Tax Reforms and Labor Supply143
Note: Data are from the March Current Population Survey, 1976-1993. Regressions include education
and education squared for the sample of all men only; age and age squared, unearned income, family
size, a dummy variable for marital status (= 1 if married), a dummy variable for race (= 1 if nonwhite),
business cycle controls (contemporaneous and lagged GDP growth rate), and cohort dummy variables.
Participation figures are based on 100 percentage points. Data are presented as mean value (standard
error).
Time, pre-tax reform; Time82, Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981; Time87, Tax Reform Act of 1986.
increased by 61.6 hours per year. For the most educated group, annual
participation rose by 1.2 percentage points and total hours worked rose
by 31 hours per year.
4.4 Alternative Specifications
The previous estimates are preferable to the initial estimates because
they use the timing of the tax laws to identify the response. However,
they are restrictive in that they impose linear trends. An even more







Panel A: Annual Participation
All men -0.141 (0.00) 0.113 (0.00) 0.210 (0.03)
Education
Less than high school -0.351 (0.07) 0.141 (0.11) 0.260 (0.09)
High school -0.142 (0.04) 0.259 (0.07) 0.125 (0.06)
College -0.047 (0.04) 0.068 (0.06) 0.252 (0.05)
Beyond college -0.019 (0.06) 0.013 (0.09) 0.295 (0.08)
Panel B: Weekly Participation
All men -0.272 (0.04) 0.269 (0.06) 0.208 (0.05)
Education
Less than high school -0.466 (0.10) 0.168 (0.16) 0.546 (0.14)
High school -0.431 (0.04) 0.535 (0.10) 0.128 (0.86)
College -0.013 (0.06) 0.090 (0.09) 0.112 (0.07)
Beyond college 0.153(0.10) -0.249 (0.15) 0.290 (0.12)
Panel C: Total Hours Worked
All men -13.43 (1.11) 15.83 (1.71) 5.71 (1.37)
Education
Less than high school -17.41 (2.60) 6.35 (4.24) 15.42 (3.68)
High school -17.20 (1.84) 22.18 (2.85) 4.13 (2.29)
College -7.77 (1.90) 14.36 (2.87) 2.15 (2.21)
Beyond college -3.38 (3.28) 7.26 (5.03) 7.76 (4.02)144Eissa
If p
1976 77 78 79808182 83 8485 86 87 88
Year
Ifp-1 if worked at least one hour during the year
lfpl -weeks worked/52
FIGURE 1. Labor force participation rate, 1976-1993.
flexible method of analyzing the response is to plot labor supply trends
over time. Figure 1 presents the average (annual and weekly) participa-
tion rate of men between 1976 and 1993. The two measures have differ-
ent mean values but show similar patterns. The effect of the recession in
the early 1980s is evident from the data; the participation rate falls from
1979 to 1982, after which the recovery starts. Figure 1 suggests that it is
difficult to disentangle the effect of the ERTA from the effect of the
recession because of the timing of the tax law; however, the effect of the
TRA is clearer.
To purge the trend from the effects of changes in observable characteris-
tics and cohort effects, I estimate regressions with 17-year dummy vari-
ables and the same observable characteristics included in previous regres-
sions. Separate regressions are estimated for each education group. The
marginal effects calculated from the coefficients for the year dummy vari-
ables are plotted in Figures 2 and 3. Several observations are clear. First,
the significant heterogeneity across groups in the labor supply trend is
apparent. The least educated group showed no increase in labor supply
after 1987; in fact, the labor supply declined. Predicted labor market par-
ticipation by men with less than 12 years of education never fully recov-
ered from the recession of the early 1980s. Between 1978 and 1982, the
GDP growth rate fell by 7 percentage points, from 4.5 to 2.5. Labor force



















FIGURE 2. Marginal effects: probability of participation, 1977-1993.


















FIGURE 3. Coefficients of year dummy variables: annual hours, 1977-
1993.
The participation rate of men with more than 12years of education
shows some responsiveness to the TRA: it jumps between 1 and 2per-
centage points in 1987. Although we observe similar jumps in participa-
tion rates by men with 12 years of schooling, their participation immedi-
ately declines starting in 1988. No such jumps in hours workedare
observed for the most educated men, which is the onlygroup that does
not show any decline in total hours worked after 1989 (Figure 3). Over-146Eissa
all, Figures 1-3 suggest that evidence of a male labor supply response to
the tax reforms is quite weak.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The tax reforms of the 1980s provided economists with a remarkable
opportunity to evaluate individual behavioral responses to tax reforms.
This paper has reviewed the evidence from the literature and presented
new evidence on individual behavioral responses to taxreforms.
It is useful to conclude by considering what we have not learned from
the evidence summarized and presented in this paper. Studies that di-
rectly analyzed the labor supply present evidence that the female labor
supply is responsive to taxes. The question that arises is, What parame-
ters do these studies estimate? The "difference-in-difference"approach
estimates the net response to the tax reforms, which amounts to the
uncompensated response. Generally, then, we have not learned from
this evidence the preference parameters needed to evaluate tax reforms.
There are exceptions, however. The results in Eissa (1995a) may be inter-
preted as compensated labor supply elasticities, since the TRA had a
small income effect. Still, none of the work has isolated the income
elasticity of hours worked or participation.23 Separating the income and
substitution effects requires more structural modeling of labor supply
behavior and stronger assumptions about functional form (see Blundell,
Duncan, and Meghir, 1995).24
In principle, the change in labor supply after the tax reforms includes intertemporal
substitution and income and substitution effects. Individuals may intertemporally substi-
tute labor supply if they foresee the tax change, or if they believe it to be temporary.Both
the ERTA and TRA were phased in over time, and so we should expect that some in-
tertemporal substitution in labor supply occurred. However, several reasons suggest that
the intertemporal substitution effects will be small. Using data on hours worked,empirical
labor supply research shows little intertemporal substitution (see Heckman, 1993). Also,
Hausman and Poterba (1987) argue that the after-tax rate of return is not substantially
affected for many households. In a life-cycle model of labor supply, both the path of after-
tax wages and after-tax returns matter for labor supply decisions. A stronger reason to
suspect that we estimate a long-run response is that the studies cover periodsthat com-
pletely bracket the tax changes.
The income effect is necessary for applied welfare analysis if taxpayers are making a
discrete choice, such as whether or not to participate in the labor force (Small and Rosen,
1981).
24Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1995) estimate a structural model of labor supply that
identifies the income and substitution effects from the tax reforms that took place in
England over the 1980s. The refonns raised and lowered rates during the 1980s. Blundell,
Duncan, and Meghir use these changes, along with the change in returns to educationthat
varied by cohorts, to identify the income and wage effects of the tax reform. Applying theirTax Reforms and Labor Supply147
There is an important trade-off here. Although structural models of
labor supply yield preference parameters that can be used for welfare
analysis of tax reform, they have been widely criticized for the restric-
tive assumptions imposed (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch, 1990) and
for their sensitivity to the preference and model specifications used
(Heckman, 1982; Triest, 1990). By focusing on affected groups andus-
ing arguably more exogenous variation in marginal rates, the natural
experiment approach minimizes the potential for functional formas-
sumptions to bias the results.Difference-in-difference approaches rely
on more transparent assumptions to identify the tax effect. The advan-
tage of that strategy is that the direction and size of any biases become
transparent. The disadvantage is that it generally does not yield the
preference parameters.
Building on the evidence that shows an increase in taxable income by
higher income individuals after the tax reforms, the current paper also
analyzed whether those responses were due to an increase in male labor
market participation. Although high-income married women have been
shown to be quite sensitive to the changes in marginal rates, their in-
creased labor supply does not explain the large increase in income ob-
served in tax return data. Women married to high-income men do not
earn enough to explain the surge in income.
Microdata from 1976 to 1993 show only weak evidence of a small
increased male labor supply response after the TRA of 1986. For men
with 16 years of schooling, the trend regressions show an increase in
total hours of work of about 50 hours per year, or 2 percent. This
response is much smaller than what the studies on the income re-
sponse suggest (Feenberg and Poterba, 1993; Auten and Carroll, 1995;
Feldstein, 1995; Slemrod, 1995) and suggest that the income response
observed in the tax return data is due more to factors other than labor
market participation, such as shifting of income and compensation deci-
sions. Finally, one cannot conclude from this evidence that the labor
supply of men more broadly defined to include work effort,occupa-
tional choice, and human capital accumulation, showed littleresponse
to the tax reforms.
approach to the United States would be very involved because the U.S. tax code is far more
complicated than the British tax code.
For example, one does not need to use after-tax wages in the regression, whichare
measured with error in survey data (Mroz, 198?); neither does one need to imputewages
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APPENDIX TABLE 2




Less than high school
Age (years) 39.54 (9.52)41.69 (9.47) 39.29 (9.59) 38.30 (9.36)
Education (years) 8.39 (2.47)8.34 (2.43) 8.45 (2.45) NA
Nonwhite (%) 0.16 (0.36)
Filing unit size (no.)3.01 (1.71)3.24 (1.78) 2.96 (1.66) 2.77 (1.61)
Married (no.) 0.75 (0.43)0.803 (0.398)0.746 (0.435)0.683 (0.465)
Observations (no.) 95,528 38,779 25,793 30,956
Beyond college
Age (years) 38.88 (8.10)37.5 (8.24) 38.7 (7.99) 40.2 (7.85)
Education (years) 17.78 (0.44)17.7 (0.451) 17.7 (0.438) NA
Nonwhite (%) 0.08 (.28)
Filing unit size (no.)2.89 (1.49)2.99 (1.54) 2.85 (1.47) 2.82 (1.46)
Married (no.) 0.76 (0.42)0.777 (0.417)0.756 (0.429)0.760 (0.427)
Observations (no.) 63,179 20,421 18,678 24,080
Source: Data are from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from survey years 1977-1994 and are
presented as mean value (standard deviation).
Includes men between ages 24 and 55 and excludes men who were ill, disabled, in school, or retired and those
with negative or positive earned income or zero hours of work.
NA, not available; CPS changed education codes in 1991.
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